Read the passage and mark the letter A, B, C or D on your answer sheet to indicate the best answer to each of the following questions from 31 to 40.
In US rental markets, tenants now navigate platforms and “revenue management” tools that determine prices with machine-like indifference. The Department of Justice’s 2024 complaint against RealPage alleges a 21st-century form of coordinated pricing that turns vacancy into leverage rather than relief. If price signals are gamed, competition is not corrected but curdled, and year-over-year spikes feel ineluctable. [I] For renters, the resulting asymmetry – opaque inputs, irreversible recommendations – creates a sense that the market is not merely impersonal; it is actively steered against them.
RealPage’s software, used across vast multifamily portfolios, stitches together nonpublic data to issue daily rent “guidance.” Clients’ coverage of investment-grade units yields a hegemonic influence over local markets, while default auto-accept settings normalize compliance. According to the DOJ narrative, instead of lowering prices when units languish, the model suppresses availability, thereby manufacturing shortage: this scarcity is then used to justify higher list prices. [II] Declining a recommendation often requires written justification and managerial escalation, making deviation costly, conspicuous, and, in practice, rare.
Antitrust doctrine, however, still chases evidence of explicit promises. The catch-22 is well known: without discovery you cannot prove a conspiracy; without proof you cannot get discovery. Yet tenants’ filings describe these channels – online forums, standing committees, and a splashy RealPage “RealWorld” conference – where competitors purportedly compare assumptions and harmonize tactics. [III] If courts treat such environments as “collusive communications,” the algorithm would be not a neutral calculator but an accelerant, translating shared inputs into industry-wide, vacancy-proof price floors.
Alternatives exist: Public, open-source pricing models could set guardrails: real-time affordability metrics, truth-in-pricing transparency, and standardized, auditable datasets. If algorithms were tasked to privilege affordability over yield, rents would likely trend downward across comparable units, provided transparent datasets constrained opportunistic manipulation. Pilots would require federal support, municipal capacity-building, and landlord reporting on demand elasticity so that tenant responses actually recalibrate prices. [IV] Because markets differ, linear and nonlinear models must be locally tuned rather than imposed as one-size-fits-all templates, with consumer-protection agencies updating rules for algorithmic collusion.
(Adapted from Nichole Nelson & Bakari Levy, “How Algorithms and Monopolies Hurt Tenants – and How Tech Can Help,” NCRC, Dec 19, 2024)
Question 31. The word hegemonic in paragraph 2 mostly means ______.
A. moderately contested B. marginally influential
C. largely ceremonial D. overwhelmingly dominant